Equal division among the few: an experiment about coalition formation and vNM stable set in a three-person game

Yukihiko Funaki (), Emmanuel Sol and Marc Willinger ()
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Yukihiko Funaki: Waseda University [Tokyo, Japan]
Emmanuel Sol: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier
Marc Willinger: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier

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Abstract: We study experimentally a three-person sequential and symmetric coalition formation game with empty core. The game was played repeatedly, with randomly re-matched groups. We observe that over 86% of the realized coalitions are two-person coalitions. Three players coalitions are often observed in early periods but are frequently rejected. Equal splits are the most frequently observed divisions among coalition members, and their frequency increases sharply over time. We propose a modification of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)'s notion of the vNM stable set to account for our results by introducing a bargaining cost.

Keywords: Bargaining cost; Laboratory experiment; Stable set; Coalition formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Published in Theory and Decision, In press, ⟨10.1007/s11238-025-10093-5⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05379702

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-025-10093-5

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