Paying none, some or all? Between-subject random incentives and preferences towards risk and time

Ne rien payer, payer une partie ou payer la totalité ? Incitations aléatoires entre sujets et préférences en matière de risque et de temps

Noémi Berlin (), Emmanuel Kemel (), Vincent Lenglin () and Antoine Nebout ()
Additional contact information
Noémi Berlin: EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Emmanuel Kemel: GREGHEC - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Vincent Lenglin: ANTHROPO LAB - Laboratoire d'Anthropologie Expérimentale - ETHICS EA 7446 - Experience ; Technology & Human Interactions ; Care & Society : - ICL - Institut Catholique de Lille - UCL - Université catholique de Lille, ETHICS EA 7446 - Experience ; Technology & Human Interactions ; Care & Society : - ICL - Institut Catholique de Lille - UCL - Université catholique de Lille, UCL - Université catholique de Lille
Antoine Nebout: UMR PSAE - Paris-Saclay Applied Economics - AgroParisTech - Université Paris-Saclay - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: In the context of risk and time preferences, the within-subject random incentive system (Within-RIS) is the standard real-incentive mechanism in economic experiments: each subject has one choice randomly selected for payment. In a variation, Within-RIS is applied to a fraction of subjects only: each subject has a probability of being selected and has one choice randomly selected for payment. This paper assesses the validity of this mechanism called the hybrid random incentive system (Hybrid-RIS) by investigating if/how the selection probability affects elicited risk and time preferences. We report an experiment conducted with 335 subjects across four treatments, varying the selection probability to 0, 0.1, 0.5, and 1. Using raw data statistics and structural estimations of preference parameters, we find that elicited time preferences remain stable, while risk aversion is lower when the selection probability is null. However, there are no significant differences among the non-null selection probabilities. These findings suggest that Hybrid-RIS does not distort elicited risk and time preferences.

Keywords: Risk and time preferences; Incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Journal of Economic Psychology, 2026, 112, pp.102870. ⟨10.1016/j.joep.2025.102870⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05403681

DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2025.102870

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().