The Political Economy of Mining Rent Sharing: Is Government Effectiveness Really Costly?

Isaac Amedanou ()
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Isaac Amedanou: CERDI - Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCA - Université Clermont Auvergne, UNECA - United Nations Economic Commission for Africa - United Nations

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Abstract: This paper builds on the work of a previous study to modelling the political economy factors that influence government take over the lifespan of mining projects. We extend the political economy model by incorporating the opportunity costs of preferences for side payments, thereby enhancing its predictive power to explain government take. Preferences for side payments are likely to exist only in contexts where government effectiveness is limited and corruption is rampant. Our empirical evidence using data on de jure government take in copper mining projects in Africa and Latin America confirms the theoretical predictions by the revisited political economy model. Specifically, we find that government effectiveness is a key driving factor with a two‐dimensional linkage. As government effectiveness improves, countries with high level of corruption experience lower government take, while those with high transparency and strong political regimes experience higher government take.

Keywords: Transparency; Democracy; Side payments; Corruption; Government effectiveness; Copper; Government take (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05444452v1
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Published in Journal of International Development, In press, ⟨10.1002/jid.70034⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05444452

DOI: 10.1002/jid.70034

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