Should the regulation of network industries be entrusted to competition authorities? A critical reading of the New Caledonian and Polynesian projects

Faut-il confier la régulation des industries de réseau aux autorités de concurrence ? Une lecture critique des projets calédonien et polynésien

Christian Montet (), Véronique Sélinsky and Florent Venayre ()
Additional contact information
Christian Montet: UPF - Université de la Polynésie Française
Véronique Sélinsky: Barreau de Montpellier

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: The article assesses whether competition authorities in New Caledonia and French Polynesia are the appropriate bodies to regulate network industries such as energy and telecommunications. Noting the longstanding shortcomings of regulation by local executive branches, it examines proposals to broaden the mandates of the Polynesian and Caledonian competition authorities. Drawing on economic theory and international experience, the study shows that combining regulatory and competition functions weakens the agencies' independence, clarity of remit, and overall effectiveness. It argues that, in small island economies, any potential cost savings are minimal compared with the governance risks involved. The authors ultimately advocate for strengthened cooperation with France's national energy and telecommunications regulators rather than pursuing local institutional integration.

Date: 2026-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-reg
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05508291v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Revue Française d'Economie, 2026, XL (3), pp.57-92

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-05508291v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05508291

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().