On the deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members’ shortcomings?

Eric Langlais ()
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Eric Langlais: EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Date: 2009-04
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Published in Journal of Applied Economic Sciences, 2009, 4 (1, Spring), pp.97-114

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