Sequential pricing on multisided platforms

Philippe Bontems, Stephen Hamilton () and Jason Lepore
Additional contact information
Philippe Bontems: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Stephen Hamilton: United States of America
Jason Lepore: United States of America

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Multisided platforms have emerged as an increasingly important market structure with the rise of the digital economy. In this paper, we consider sequential price setting behavior by platforms and demonstrate sequential pricing outcomes Pareto dominate simultaneous pricing outcomes in terms of firm and industry profits. We compare policy implications and find prices are more balanced across the platform and average prices are higher under sequential pricing than under simultaneous pricing. We also demonstrate that pricing power can be considered independently on each side of the market under multihoming behavior.

Keywords: Platform competition; Two-sided markets; Network effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-09
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-05513277v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Economics Letters, 2025, 255, pp.112543. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112543⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-05513277v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05513277

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112543

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().