Is Competition Only One Click Away? The Digital Markets Act’s Impact on Google Maps

Louis-Daniel Pape and Michelangelo Rossi ()
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Louis-Daniel Pape: ECO-Télécom Paris - Equipe Eco Economie - CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - ENSAI - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information [Bruz] - Groupe ENSAE-ENSAI - Groupe des Écoles Nationales d'Économie et Statistique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - ENSAE Paris - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique - Groupe ENSAE-ENSAI - Groupe des Écoles Nationales d'Économie et Statistique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Michelangelo Rossi: GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper studies the impact of the European Union (EU) Digital Markets Act (DMA) on user search behavior and traffic to online mapping services, focusing on recent changes to Google's search results page. In January 2024, Google altered the display of location-based queries for EU users by removing clickable maps and direct links to Google Maps. We exploit this policy-induced change and implement a difference-in-differences design comparing EU and non-EU countries to assess how the removal of Google's self-preferencing shaped search volumes and traffic patterns. Search queries for maps and Google Maps increased by more than 21%. Although the former may reflect broader interest in mapping services, the latter directly signals intent to use Google Maps. Yet, this surge in searches primarily redirected users back to Google Maps. Traffic data reveal no significant change in overall visits to www.google.com/maps on desktops or mobile devices. Instead, we observe shifts in the channels through which users access the service and in session duration. No corresponding increase in search activity or traffic is observed for Bing Maps nor for other competing mapping services. These findings indicate that the DMA had weak competitive effects, highlighting Google Maps' dominance in a market where alternatives remain limited.

Keywords: Self-preferencing; Digital Platforms; Online Search; Digital Markets Act; Google Maps (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-01-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
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Published in Marketing Science, 2026, ⟨10.1287/mksc.2025.0159⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05564479

DOI: 10.1287/mksc.2025.0159

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