Laws and Norms

Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole
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Roland Bénabou: Princeton University
Jean Tirole: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, IAST - Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse

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Abstract: We analyze how private decisions and optimal public policies are shaped by personal and societal preferences, material incentives, and social norms. We show how honor and stigma interact with incentives and derive optimal taxation. We then analyze the expressive role of law as embodying society's values and identify when it calls for a weakening or a strengthening of incentives. The law should be softened when it signals agents' general willingness to contribute to the public good and toughened when it signals social externalities. We also shed light on norms-based interventions, societies' resistance to economists' messages, and the avoidance of cruel and unusual punishments.

Keywords: Expressive law; Social norms; Incentives; Motivation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Published in Journal of Political Economy, 2026, 134 (2), pp.731-772. ⟨10.1086/738343⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05577272

DOI: 10.1086/738343

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