Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting

Georges Dionne (), Nathalie Fombaron () and Neil Doherty
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Nathalie Fombaron: EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Neil Doherty: Wharton School - University of Pennsylvania [Philadelphia]

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Date: 2012
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Published in Handbook of Insurance, pp.231-280, 2012, ⟨10.2139/ssrn.2132555⟩

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Working Paper: Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting (2012)
Working Paper: Adverse selection in insurance contracting (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05617341

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2132555

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