 Predatory Acquisitions in European Competition Law: A Distortion of Economic Reality?Anne Tercinet ()
Post-Print from HAL Abstract: Antitrust experts use the term ‘predatory acquisition' to describe a situation in which a company takes control of a start-up in order to eliminate potential future competition from that start-up. Some refer to this as a killer acquisition, in that the acquiring company kills off the innovation generated by the acquired company and its potential competition through this merger-acquisition. This term ‘killer acquisition' was first used by American economists in a study on the pharmaceutical sector. The two sectors most affected would be the pharmaceutical sector in the broad sense, i.e., including the biotech sector, and the digital sector. In the United States, as in Europe, competition authorities have been concerned about the most appropriate legal approach to these acquisitions. Within the European Union and the European Economic Area, these acquisitions fall below the thresholds for review under the European Merger Regulation. In response to what the Commission described as a threat to innovation and consumer welfare in two crucial economic sectors, the Commission and the Court developed solutions.The Decision of 6 November 2025 from the French Competition Authority constitutes the first application of CJEU judgment of 16 March 2023, C-449/21, Towercast by this National Competition Authority. It provides an opportunity to review the treatment of predatory acquisitions in European competition law and to list all its legal consequences, before questioning its adequacy in relation to the economic reality of predatory acquisitions. Keywords: Pharmaceutical industry; Predatory acquisition; Killer acquisition; Merger control; Digital Market; Attempt to monopolize; Abuse of a dominant position (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Juris Diversitas General Conference 10th, Jul 2026, Athens, Greece There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05704518 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.