Managing Credibility in Green Bond Markets Dynamic Subsidy Design under Investor Learning
Riadh Ben Jelili ()
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Riadh Ben Jelili: LEGO - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion de l'Ouest - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - UBO EPE - Université de Brest - IMT - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] - IBSHS - Institut Brestois des Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société - UBO EPE - Université de Brest - UBL - Université Bretagne Loire - IMT Atlantique - IMT Atlantique - IMT - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris], Brest IAE - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises (IAE) - Brest - UBO EPE - Université de Brest - Bretagne INP - Institut National Polytechnique de Bretagne
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Abstract:
This paper presents a dynamic Stackelberg framework for green bond markets, considering private environmental information and endogenous investor learning. The regulator selects issuance and certification subsidies while anticipating their effects on future beliefs and institutional credibility. Static subsidies address current under-issuance but do not account for how current participation influences future beliefs. A forward-looking regulator considers this feedback and sets subsidies that exceed the static benchmark. An unexpected result is that higher subsidies attract more low-type firms, diluting average beliefs and working against policy goals. The dynamic premium operates through credibility-building, ranging from 9% to 138% in calibrated scenarios, with the largest impact when credibility is persistent, certification distinguishes between types, and the regulator is patient. Certification subsidies work alongside issuance subsidies in the dynamic framework. The model predicts that issuance subsidies enhance future beliefs when certification credibility is high and diminish them when it is low.
Keywords: D82; D83; C73; H23; G14; G18; Sustainable Finance Policy Q58; Heterogeneous Investors; Greenwashing; Certification Markets; Credibility and Reputation; Investor Learning; Dynamic Incentive Design; Green Bonds; Green Bonds Dynamic Incentive Design Investor Learning Credibility and Reputation Certification Markets Greenwashing Heterogeneous Investors Sustainable Finance Policy Q58 G18 G14 H23 C73 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-06-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05737179v1
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Published in The 42nd international conference of the French Finance Association (AFFI), IAE Clermont Auvergne - School of Management, Jun 2026, Clermont-Ferrand, France
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05737179
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