On Stackelberg competition in strategic multilateral exchange

Ludovic Julien ()
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Ludovic Julien: EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: In this paper, we consider a strategic equilibrium concept which extends Stackelberg competition to cover a general equilibrium framework. From the benchmark of strategic market games proposed by Sahi and Yao (1989), we define the notion of Stackelberg equilibrium. This concept captures strategic interactions in interrelated markets on which a finite number of leaders and followers compete on quantities. Within the framework of an example, convergence and welfare are studied. More specifically, we analyze convergence toward the competitive equilibrium and make welfare comparisons with other strategic equilibria.

Keywords: Convergence; Welfare; Stackelberg general equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-03
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Published in Research in Economics, 2013, 67 (1), pp.59-75. ⟨10.1016/j.rie.2012.09.001⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05758718

DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2012.09.001

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