Stackelberg-Walras and Cournot-Walras Equilibria in Mixed Markets: A Comparison

Ludovic Julien ()
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Ludovic Julien: EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: In this note, we compare two strategic general equilibrium concepts: the Stackelberg-Walras equilibrium and the Cournot-Walras equilibrium. We thus consider a market exchange economy embodying atoms and a continuum of traders. It is shown that, when the preferences of the small traders are represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions, the Stackel-berg-Walras and the Cournot-Walras equilibria can coincide only if 1) the endowments and preferences of atoms are identical and 2) the elasticity of the followers' best response functions are equal to zero in equilibrium.

Keywords: Stackelberg Competition; Exchange Economies; Preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Published in Theoretical Economics Letters, 2012, 02 (01), pp.69-74. ⟨10.4236/tel.2012.21013⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05758740

DOI: 10.4236/tel.2012.21013

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