Specialized oligopolies in a pure exchange economy: The symmetric Cournot–Walras equilibrium

Ludovic Julien () and Fabrice Tricou ()
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Ludovic Julien: EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Fabrice Tricou: EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper explores the symmetric Cournot–Walras equilibrium (SCWE) as an alternative concept to the asymmetric Cournot–Walras equilibrium (ACWE) a` la Codognato–Gabszewicz. All agents have specialized initial endowments but generalized consumption activities: they are strategic suppliers of the only good they own and competitive demanders of all the other ones. Two kinds of results are showed in the framework of an example. First, the asymptotic identification of this strategic equilibrium with the competitive equilibrium when all markets are replicated and its asymptotic identification with the ACWE when all markets but one are replicated. Second, when the SCWE is compared to the Walrasian equilibrium (WE), two results are obtained in terms of welfare.

Keywords: Oligopolistic competition; Specialization; General equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-09
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Published in Research in Economics, 2005, 59 (3), pp.280-292. ⟨10.1016/j.rie.2005.06.002⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05758883

DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2005.06.002

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