Optimally stubborn: how long to hold and who will fold?

Anna Sanktjohanser
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Anna Sanktjohanser: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: I consider a model of reputational bargaining in which the stubborn type can choose their initial demand. There are two types of players: rational and stubborn. The game has two stages: a demand stage and a concession stage. Types can pool or separate in equilibrium for any fixed probability of facing a stubborn type. When the probability of facing a stubborn type is small, any feasible payoff can be achieved in equilibrium for either type. When the probability is large, there is either immediate agreement or long delays.

Date: 2026-05
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Published in Theoretical Economics, 2026, Vol. 21 (n°2), pp.402-433. ⟨10.3982/TE5977⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05771096

DOI: 10.3982/TE5977

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