No effect of endowment risk on dictator giving in the lab

Mickael Beaud (), Yujiang Sun () and Marc Willinger ()
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Mickael Beaud: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier
Yujiang Sun: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier
Marc Willinger: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier

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Abstract: While various models of inequality aversion predict different effects of background risk on giving, empirical evidence remains mixed. This study presents a laboratory experiment using a modified dictator game to examine whether exposure to an additive, zero-mean background risk affecting endowments influences giving behavior. Our results show that such exposure does not significantly affect average donation amounts, the likelihood of giving nothing, or the tendency to split resources equally. These findings are consistent with ex ante inequality concerns under risk neutrality; however, overall, our experimental data do not support the behavioral predictions implied by purely ex post inequality aversion.

Keywords: Inequality aversion; Background risk; Dictator game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-05777756v1
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Published in Economics Letters, 2026, 259, pp.112774. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112774⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05777756

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112774

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