An anatomical review of the common pool resource game
Antoine Malezieux () and
Eli Spiegelman ()
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Antoine Malezieux: BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - ESC Dijon-Bourgogne, CEREN - Centre de Recherche sur les Entreprises - BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - ESC Dijon-Bourgogne
Eli Spiegelman: BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - ESC Dijon-Bourgogne, CEREN - Centre de Recherche sur les Entreprises - BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - ESC Dijon-Bourgogne
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Abstract:
Over the last four decades, a broad stream of experimental literature has been published using the Common Pool Resource (CPR) game to study how people react to congestible resources, and how to keep such resources from socially harmful overexploitation. With the goal of providing guidance to future work on this still-important paradigm, we provide a narrative review of the literature, summarizing the results for several key aspects of the experimental operationalization. We classify these aspects into two broad categories. The first describes ‘environmental' assumptions on the modeled resource problem itself. This refers to aspects of the experimental environment reflecting factors such as group size, resource size and asymmetry of access, which generally constitute the nature of the dilemma. The second category involves ‘institutional' issues related to how people might solve the problem, such as user communication between subjects, information about previous subjects' choices, and regulatory measures.
Keywords: Climate change; Common pool; Commons dilemma; Experiment; Harvesting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05797893v1
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Published in Experimental Economics, 2025, 28 (3), pp.468-491. ⟨10.1017/eec.2024.6⟩
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05797893
DOI: 10.1017/eec.2024.6
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