Privacy, competition, and multi-homing

Jean-Marc Zogheib ()
Additional contact information
Jean-Marc Zogheib: UPN SEGMI - Université Paris Nanterre - UFR Sciences économiques, gestion, mathématiques, informatique - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Two platforms compete in prices and information disclosure levels. Platforms derive revenues from two possible channels, i.e., by supplying their service to consumers and by selling consumer data to a data intermediary. While a consumer signing up to one platform's service decides how much personal information to provide to improve service quality, the platform chooses how much such consumer data to share with the third-party data intermediary. We find that platforms essentially trade-off between consumer valuations and disclosure levels to determine their business strategies when consumers single-home. Under multi-homing, business strategies are more complex to assess and may completely shift compared to single-homing. The valuation of consumer data onto the data intermediary is a decisive component of platforms' choices. All things being equal, implementing a strict privacy regime with no data disclosure can be optimal under single-homing, while a soft privacy regime with data disclosure may be preferred under multi-homing.

Keywords: Competition; Online privacy; Information disclosure; Multi-homing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-reg
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05834698v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Information Economics and Policy, 2026, 73, pp.101182. ⟨10.1016/j.infoecopol.2026.101182⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-05834698v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05834698

DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2026.101182

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().