Proportional representation paradoxes, systemic pathologies, and unintended consequences in Aruba, Curaçao, and Sint Maarten
Mostapha Diss,
Eric Kamwa () and
Abdelmonaim Tlidi
Additional contact information
Eric Kamwa: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Abdelmonaim Tlidi: UAE - Abdelmalek Essaadi University [Tétouan] = Université Abdelmalek Essaadi [Tétouan]
Post-Print from HAL
Abstract:
Proportional representation (PR) governs the translation of votes into seats, but parliaments decide by majority rule, which transforms each seat vector into a distribution of a priori pivotal power. This second mapping is highly nonlinear and is left largely implicit by standard seats-votes analyses. We audit it in the three Caribbean constituent countries of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Aruba, Curaçao, and Sint Maarten), which use closely related list-PR rules in single nationwide districts with 15- or 21-seat chambers and no statutory threshold, yet display divergent party-system trajectories. Computing exact Shapley-Shubik indices (with Banzhaf indices as a robustness check) for all 17 parliaments elected in 2010-2025, we document the incidence of well-known properties of weighted majority games: two parties holding 61.9% of the seats hold all a priori pivotal power under simple-majority rule; in seven elections, at least one seated party, holding up to a third of the chamber, has zero a priori pivotal power; and parties with under 10% of the seats can match the power of parties more than four times their size. Treating the cases as a qualified natural experiment, we situate these results within each country's party-system trajectory, volatility, and coalition formation. Proportionality of representation does not imply proportionality of decision-making power, and small chambers with low effective thresholds make the discontinuities of the seats-to-power mapping especially visible.
Keywords: Coalition formation; Micro-states; Electoral paradoxes; Power indices; Voting power; Proportional representation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Published in Public Choice, In press
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05842843
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().