Do Airlines Adopt Sustainable Aviation Fuels Under Modal Competition?
Sai Bravo-Melgarejo () and
Estelle Malavolti ()
Additional contact information
Sai Bravo-Melgarejo: CEA - CEA- Saclay - CEA - Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives
Estelle Malavolti: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, LEEA - ENAC - Laboratoire d'Economie et d'Econométrie de l'Aérien - ENAC - Ecole Nationale de l'Aviation Civile
Post-Print from HAL
Abstract:
Reducing the level of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in air transport calls for policies that support less polluting fuels. The International Civil Aviation Organization and the European Union have launched policies to support the adoption of sustainable aviation fuels (SAFs). Although Article 15 of the 1944 Chicago Convention forbids the use of discriminatory charges, Article 3 of the European Union's Airport Charges Directive allows charge modulation if related to matters of public interest - such as climate change mitigation. Recently, Lyon, Stuttgart, and airports within the Swedavia AB have implemented a CO2-based aeronautical charges modulation. Our paper studies the effect of authorizing such differentiated charges in the context of intermodal competition. We find that with uniform tariffs, airlines have no incentive to use SAFs. However, if a regulator authorizes discriminatory aeronautical charges, airlines may have the incentive to use more environmentally friendly fuel. Furthermore, when the cost of SAF is small compared to passengers' disutility from not traveling with their preferred transportation mode, then discriminatory charges increase air transportation's market share.
Keywords: Air transport; Regulation; Sustainable aviation fuels; Two-sided platform; Intermodal competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-10-24
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Published in Review of Industrial Organization, 2026, ⟨10.1007/s11151-026-10067-z⟩
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05854450
DOI: 10.1007/s11151-026-10067-z
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().