Négociation d'engagements en matière de concentrations: une perspective d'économiste

Patrice Bougette

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Abstract: This article aims at studying the economic dimension of the bargaining process in merger control by using the latest results from the literature. After recalling the classic typology of merger remedies, we look at what is at stake in the negotiation between merging parties and the competition authority. The tradeoff between merger remedies, efficiency gains expected from the file, and the length of the authority's investigation is at the core of the bargaining process. Lastly, assessing the success of the negotiation provides insight into how to best implement merger remedies.

Keywords: Concentrations; Négociation; Engagements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-03-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00580669
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Revue internationale de droit économique, 2011, 4 (Les Dossiers), pp.111-124

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00580669

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