A methodological note on a weighted voting experiment

Eric Guerci, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Naoki Watanabe (), Gabriele Esposito and Xiaoyan Lu ()
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Naoki Watanabe: Economics Department - Université de Tsukuba = University of Tsukuba
Xiaoyan Lu: GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We conducted a sensitivity analysis of the results of weighted voting experiments by varying two features of the experimental protocol by Montero et al. (Soc Choice Welf 30(1):69-87, 2008): (1) the way in which the roles of subjects are reassigned in each round [random role (RR) vs. fixed role (FR)] and (2) the number of proposals that subjects can simultaneously approve [multiple approval (MA) vs. single approval (SA)]. It was observed that the differences in these protocols had impacts on the relative frequencies of minimum winning coalitions (MWCs) as well as how negotiations proceed. 3-player MWCs were more frequently observed, negotiations were much longer, subjectsmade less mistakes, and proposal-objection dynamics were more frequently observed, under the protocol with FR and SA than under the protocol with RR and MA.

Keywords: experimental economics; voting systems; cooperative game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-03-23
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2014, 43 (4), pp.827-850. ⟨10.1007/s00355-014-0814-y⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: A methodological note on a weighted voting experiment (2014)
Working Paper: A Methodological Note on a Weighted Voting Experiment (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01061445

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-014-0814-y

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