Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring

Marie Laclau ()

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Abstract: I consider repeated games with private monitoring played on a network. Each player has a set of neighbors with whom he interacts: a player's payoff depends on his own and his neighbors' actions only. Monitoring is private and imperfect: each player observes his stage payoff but not the actions of his neighbors. Players can communicate costlessly at each stage: communication can be public, private or a mixture of both. Payoffs are assumed to be sensitive to unilateral deviations. First, for any network, a folk theorem holds if some Joint Pairwise Identifiability condition regarding payoff functions is satisfied. Second, a necessary and sufficient condition on the network topology for a folk theorem to hold for all payoff functions is that no two players have the same set of neighbors not counting each other.

Keywords: Communication; Folk theorem; Imperfect private monitoring; Networks; Repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, 87, pp.136-160. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2014.04.009⟩

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Journal Article: Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01109156

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.04.009

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