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Quelles garanties pour la procédure d’engagements en droit de la concurrence de l’Union Européenne?

Frédéric Marty and Mehdi Mezaguer ()

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Abstract: Alongside with the effects-based approach, the negotiated procedures constitute the second main pillar of the EU competition policy modernisation. This modernisation aims at enhancing the legal certainty of all the enforcement stakeholders, by reducing the false-positive risks and by limiting the risk of decision annulments in the judicial control process. It also aims at generating efficiency gains, especially procedural ones. Nowadays, the recourse to commitments procedures appears as overwhelmingly dominant in energy sector cases and also in the software industry ones. This dominance raises several concerns. Remedies may be sometimes seen as disproportionate, insufficiently related to the theory of damage, or harmful in terms of stakeholders' fundamental rights. For instance, the commitments procedures are seen as limiting the scope of the Commission's decision judicial review. Our article analyses these risks and maps out some options to master them.

Keywords: competition law; negotiated procedures; fundamental rights; judicial control; droit de la concurrence; procédures négociées; droits fondamentaux; contrôle juridictionnel (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-05-27
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Published in Revue internationale de droit économique, 2016, XXX (2016-1), pp.55-89

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Journal Article: Quelles garanties pour la procédure d’engagements en droit de la concurrence de l’Union européenne ? (2016) Downloads
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