Negociated Procedures in EU Competion Law

Frédéric Marty and Mehdi Mezaguer ()

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Abstract: The enforcement of EU competition law in the field of antitrust, e.g., the sanction of abuse of dominant position and collusive agreements, increasingly uses negotiated procedures. Negotiating remedies with incriminated undertakings is a well-known practice in the field of merger control. The practice of settlements is also significantly developed in the United States. However, it remains a relative new approach under the EU competition law enforcement. This chapter presents the three main tools at the disposal of the EU Commission: the leniency program, the direct settlement, and the commitment procedures. It analyses their main challenges and issues in both legal and economic fields.

Keywords: Antitrust policy; Leniency Program; Transaction; commitments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-10-16
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Published in Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello. Encyclopaedia of Law and Economics, SPRINGER, 2018, 978-1-4614-7883-6

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01896976

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