Controlling private economic power: lessons learned from the US experience in the first decades of the 20th century

Thierry Kirat () and Frédéric Marty
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Thierry Kirat: TRIANGLE - Triangle : action, discours, pensée politique et économique - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - IEP Lyon - Sciences Po Lyon - Institut d'études politiques de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CERCRID - Centre de Recherches Critiques sur le Droit - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Concerns related to Big Techs have led to a proliferation of legislative initiatives to complete competition rules with regulatory devices that would lead gatekeepers to be subject to obligations to preserve an equality of opportunities on the market. Within this context, this contribution revisits American decision-making practice from the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century to show how regulatory-type interventions and the enforcement of competition rules have been activated to control the strategies of firms acting as gatekeepers. What we can learn from this experience is that a big firm having private regulatory power carrying out an activity affecting the public interest could and should be subject to specific supervision.

Keywords: Regulation; US Supreme Court Case Law; Digital Platforms; Antitrust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-09-26
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Published in Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, 2025, 18 (31), pp.1-28. ⟨10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2025.18.31.6⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-05286836

DOI: 10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2025.18.31.6

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