Making what's common invisible

L’invisibilisation du commun

Antoinette Baujard

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Abstract: This paper describes from an analytical and normative perspective how economics reduces what's common to its individual components only. The ignorance by welfare economics of its normative challenge results from "welfarism", the framework according to which social welfare just depends on individual utilities and no other information. The paper recalls the context of the elaboration of welfarism. Based on the teachings derived from Arrow's impossibility theorem and Sen's liberal paretian, the paper shows the consequences of these informational restrictions, and allows to identify the avenues for taking what's (only) common seriously. The paper concludes as an invitation to revisit the implication of the community members in collective decisions.

Keywords: social choice; common; well-being; social welfare; individual well-being; welfarism; informational restriction; making of ignorance; commun; choix social; fabrique de l’ignorance; restriction informationnelle; welfarisme; bien-être individuel; bien-être social; bien-être (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Published in Droit et Cultures, 2025, 88 (1), ⟨10.4000/15d13⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-05424139

DOI: 10.4000/15d13

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