Team production on the battlefield: Evidence from NATO in Afghanistan

Thiemo Fetzer, Oliver Vanden Eynde and Austin Wright
Additional contact information
Thiemo Fetzer: University of Warwick [Coventry], Universität Bonn = University of Bonn, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research
Oliver Vanden Eynde: PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research
Austin Wright: University of Chicago

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Managing military operations across and between teams of partner nations remains a first-order challenge to security and development during conflict. NATO, under the umbrella of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), brought together troops from 28 countries to help enhance security provision in Afghanistan. ISAF units were given responsibility for specific operational units. The assignment of responsibilities to different national armed forces could lead to coordination problems. We explore whether the provision of security is affected by horizontal frictions (when different countries are responsible for different sides of borders) or vertical frictions (when different countries control different levels of the operational hierarchy). We find that both horizontal frictions and vertical frictions are also associated with higher levels of insurgent violence. They also reduce military support activities, including aid projects and patrol activity. These findings indicate that misalignment between units within military organizations can undermine the effectiveness of security and development interventions during war.

Date: 2026-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2026, 241, ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107385⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-05661393

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107385

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().