Competition law enforcement in dynamic markets: proposing a flexible trade-off between fines and behavioural injunctions

Patrice Bougette (), Frédéric Marty () and Simone Vannuccini
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Patrice Bougette: UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur, GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur
Frédéric Marty: GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur, OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po, CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations [Montréal, Canada] = Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organizations [Montréal, Canada]
Simone Vannuccini: UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur, GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur

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Abstract: In prohibition decisions concerning abuses of dominance, competition authorities typically combine monetary fines, which deter anticompetitive conduct, with behavioural injunctions, which aim to restore competitive conditions. Yet the long-term effectiveness of such injunctions is often undermined by design flaws, strategic circumvention, and technological or competitive change. Focusing on the EU context, we propose a two-tier sanctioning framework that preserves deterrence while introducing ex post flexibility: an immediate baseline fine combined with a conditional component that is activated when behavioural obligations are lifted prematurely or fail to achieve their intended effects. We formalise this mechanism in a stylised model that yields a transparent switching condition and discuss its institutional implementation through trusteeships, rendezvous clauses, and judicial review. Our proposal enhances both the credibility and adaptability of competition-law remedies without weakening deterrence, while clarifying the circumstances under which fines and injunctions should operate as complements or, alternatively, as substitutes, in dynamic market

Keywords: responsive regulation.; dynamic competition; behavioural injunctions; fines; Abuses of dominant position (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-08-28
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Published in The European Competition Journal, 2026, pp.1-37. ⟨10.1080/17441056.2026.2719262⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-05732931

DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2026.2719262

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