Allocating Students to Schools: Theory, Methods, and Empirical Insights

Yeon-Koo Che (), Julien Grenet () and Yinghua He ()
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Yeon-Koo Che: Columbia University [New York]
Julien Grenet: PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, IPP - Institut des politiques publiques
Yinghua He: Rice University [Houston]

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Abstract: This chapter surveys the application of matching theory to school choice, motivated by the shift from neighborhood assignment systems to choice-based models. Since educational choice is not mediated by price, the design of allocation mechanisms is critical. The chapter first reviews theoretical contributions, exploring the fundamental trade-offs between efficiency, stability, and strategyproofness, and covers design challenges such as tie-breaking, cardinal welfare, and affirmative action. It then transitions to the empirical landscape, focusing on the central challenge of inferring student preferences from application data, especially under strategic mechanisms. We review various estimation approaches and discuss key insights on parental preferences, market design trade-offs, and the effectiveness of school choice policies.

Keywords: Preference Estimation; Top Trading Cycles; Immediate Acceptance; Deferred Acceptance; Matching Theory; School Choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-12
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05528233v1
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Published in Handbook of the Economics of Matching, 2, Elsevier, pp.307-407, 2025, Handbook of the Economics of Matching, 978-0-443-42863-0. ⟨10.1016/bs.hesmat.2025.10.004⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-05528233

DOI: 10.1016/bs.hesmat.2025.10.004

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