Optimal enfranchisement

Marc Fleurbaey () and Ulysse Lojkine
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Marc Fleurbaey: PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris
Ulysse Lojkine: AxPo - AxPo Observatory of Market Society Polarization - Sciences Po - Sciences Po, CRIS - Centre de recherche sur les inégalités sociales (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: We study the optimal voting franchise for a decision which affects different persons with different intensities. When the agents' opinions are ex ante permutation invariant, we show that it is optimal to restrict the franchise to the agents with the highest stakes, with a smaller franchise when the stakes are more concentrated. When they are i.i.d. (all voters independently favour Yes with the same probability p), we further show that two forces are at work: on the one hand, the imperative to restrict voting rights to those most affected; on the other, when and only when p ≠ 1/2 , the Condorcet jury effect according to which allowing more voters to participate increases the probability of making the right decision. This helps to shed light on the problem in large populations.

Date: 2025
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Published in Social Choice and Welfare, inPress, ⟨10.1007/s00355-025-01607-9⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-05158588

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-025-01607-9

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