Optimal Regulation of Electricity Provision with Rolling and Systemic Blackouts

Catherine Bobtcheff (), Philippe de Donder () and François Salanié
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Catherine Bobtcheff: PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Philippe de Donder: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
François Salanié: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: We set up a static model of electricity provision in which delivery to consumers is only imperfectly reliable. Blackouts can be either rolling or systemic; in both cases a price cap has to be imposed on the wholesale market. We characterize optimal allocations and we show that for any given value of the price cap on the wholesale market, one can decentralize these allocations thanks to two types of regulatory instruments: a retail tax, and capacity subsidies. Some properties follow. If demand is affected by multiplicative shocks only, capacity subsidies are exactly financed by the revenues from the retail tax. If moreover the distribution of systemic blackouts is exogenous, a price cap is sufficient, provided it is set at the value of lost load. In all other cases, all instruments are needed, and capacity subsidies need to be differentiated, based on the correlation between available capacity and its social value.

Keywords: Electricity; Reliability; Renewables; Climate Change (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-reg
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