Le vote par assentiment: une expérience

Michel Balinski, Rida Laraki (), Jean-François Laslier and Karine Van der Straeten ()
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Rida Laraki: CECO - Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Approval voting : an Experiment On April 21, 2002, the day of the first round of the French Presidential elections, we conducted a relatively large scale test of approval voting "live" - in parallel with the official vote. The essential idea of approval voting is this: instead of voting for a single candidate electors may vote for ("give their approval to") as many candidates as they wish. Voters at six voting bureaus were invited to participate immediately after having cast their official ballots. This paper describes the experiment and presents the principal results. The file of the complete results is available for research purposes and may be obtained from the authors.

Keywords: Approval voting; Experiment; French presidential election; Vote par assentiment; Expérience; Election présidentielle française (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00242959v1
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