How to manage multiple interdepedent agents

Pierre Fleckinger ()
Additional contact information
Pierre Fleckinger: CECO - Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We analyze a simple firm model in a principal multiagent framework under adverse selection. The firm's efficiency depends on the effort devoted to productive activities as well as on the fit between the divisions, for which costly coordination actions can be undertaken. The specificity of the model is that the hidden information may not be ranked objectively, as opposed to more standard models which assume the Spence-Mirrlees condition. This specificity ordinarily induces a non-monotous rent profile over the types and might lead to pooling. Nonetheless, a sufficient condition is given for the rents to be completely eliminated. It is related to the Principal's ability to create ''bayesian'' countervailing incentives.

Keywords: Multi-agent; Planification; Sélection adverse; Unfavourable selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00242983v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-00242983v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00242983

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().