Stable Allocation Mechanism

Mourad Baïou () and Michel Balinski
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Mourad Baïou: CECO - Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The stable allocation problem is the generalization of the well-known and much studied stable (0,1)-matching problems to the allocation of real numbers (hours or quantities). There are two distinct sets of agents, a set I of "employees" or "buyers" and a set J of "employers" or "sellers", each agent with preferences over the opposite set and each with a given available time or quantity. In common with its specializations, and allocation problem may have exponentially many stable solutions (though in the "generic" case it has exactly one stable allocation). A mechanism is a function that selects exactly one stable allocation for any problem. The "employee-optimal" mechanism XI that always selects xI, the "employee-optimal" stable allocation, is characterized as the unique one that is, for employees, either "efficient", or "monotone", or "strategy-proof."

Keywords: Affectation stable; Mariage stable; Couplage stable; Transport ordinal; Problème d'admission; Many-to-many matching; Two sided market; Stable assignment; Stable marriage; Stable matching; Two-sided market; Ordinal transportation; University admissions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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