Cores of combined games

Francis Bloch and Geoffroy de Clippel

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing two coalitional games. It is shown that the set of balanced transferable utility games can be partitioned into equivalence classes of component games whose core is equal to the core of the combined game. On the other hand, for non balanced games, the binary relation associating two component games whose combination has an empty core is not transitive. However, we identify a class of non balanced games which, combined with any other non balanced game, has an empty core.

Keywords: Cooperative games; Core; Additivity; Issue Linkage; Multi Issue Bargaining; Jeux coopératifs; coeur; additivité; négociation multidimensionnelle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-07
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00356298v1
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Related works:
Journal Article: Cores of combined games (2010)
Working Paper: Cores of Combined Games (2009)
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