Coalitional Equilibria of Strategic Games

Rida Laraki ()
Additional contact information
Rida Laraki: X-DEP-ECO - Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: Let N be a set of players, C the set of permissible coalitions and G an N-playerstrategic game. A profile is a coalitional-equilibrium if no coalition permissible coalition in C has a unilateral deviation that profits to all its members. Nash-equilibria consider only single player coalitions and Aumann strong-equilibria permit all coalitions to deviate. A new fixed point theorem allows to obtain a condition for the existence of coalitional equilibria that covers Glicksberg for the existence of Nash-equilibria and is related to Ichiishi's condition for the existence of Aumann strong-equilibria.

Keywords: Fixed point theorems; maximum of non-transitive preferences; Nash and strong equilibria; coalitional equilibria; Théorème de points fixes; maximum d'une préférence non transitive; équilibre de Nash; équilibre fort de Aumann; équilibre coalitionnel (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-11-02
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00429293
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-00429293/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00429293

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().