The utopia of implementing international monetary policy cooperation through domestic institutions

Florin Bilbiie ()
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Florin Bilbiie: HEC Paris - Recherche - Hors Laboratoire - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales

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Abstract: In a wide variety of international macro models monetary policy cooperation is optimal, non-cooperative policies are inefficient, but optimal policies can be attained noncooperatively by optimal design of domestic institutions. We show that given endogenous instititional design, inefficiencies of noncooperation cannot and will not be eliminated. Credible contracts are introduced as the contracts that would be chosen by the governments based on their individual rationality. These will be inefficient when compared to the optimal ones. Implementation of the latter implicity embeds an assumption about cooperation at the delegation stage, which is inconsistent with the advocated non-cooperative nature of the solution. A general solution method for credible contracts and an example from international monetary policy cooperation are considered. Our results could explain some inefficiencies of existing delegation schemes and hint to a stronger coordinating role for supranational authorities in international policy coordination.

Keywords: utopia; monetary policy cooperation; domestic institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Published in 2002

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Working Paper: The Utopia of implementing international monetary policy cooperation through domestic institutions (2005)
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