Performance des grands groupes et stratégies de rétribution des dirigeants

Georges Trepo and Patrice Roussel ()
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Georges Trepo: HEC Paris - Recherche - Hors Laboratoire - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales
Patrice Roussel: LIRHE - Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de recherche sur les Ressources Humaines et l'Emploi - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: In today's managerial world (corporate governance, shareholders' wealth maximization, agency theory) how are CEOs paid in the 700 layest French firms ? What are the various components of total compensation: fixed camp, bonus fringes, stock options ? What parties influence the mix and amounts : board, compensation committee, CEO himself, etc. ? On what criteria is CEOs' compensation based : objective / subjective criteria, short term / medium term, etc. ? What ratio between the various layers of employees from CEO to workers? How and where are CEOs recruited ? These are the major questions to which we produce answers. We also tests various theories like tournament or compensation as a key element of social status.

Keywords: CEO compensation; agency theory; corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in 1999

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