Coordination au sein d'une économie simplifiée: l'économie évolutionnaire des cacahuètes tabou

Cyrille Piatecki ()
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Cyrille Piatecki: LEO - Laboratoire d'économie d'Orleans [2008-2011] - UO - Université d'Orléans - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The problem of decentralized coordination of individual behavior and economic adjustment towards a specific equilibrium keeps to maintain classico-keynesian scission : functioning out of equilibrium or having natural abilities of selection, is the economy be able to integrate externalities which are totally foreign to agents ? This paper studies coordination abilities of a stylized economy thanks to evolutionary adjustment dynamics. In particular, taking adjustment costs of this process into account rises questions about the efficiency of Pareto optima.

Keywords: evolutionary games; Coordination; jeux évolutionnaires (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-02-17
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