Industrial organization with profit rate maximizing firms

Louis de Mesnard

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We study the impact on industrial organization of the switching of objective function, from pure profit to profit rate maximization. The output level of firm is lower at optimum. This lead to a new conception of efficiency. Cases of no coordination are considered. In perfect competition, price signal disappears; factors remain paid at their marginal productivity, but modified. In imperfect competition, reaction functions may vanish even if collusion remains possible; limit of oligopoly remains perfect competition of profit rate; the paradox of Bertrand may remain; a new concept is studied: mixed duopoly, where firms can choose and change their objective.

Keywords: Behavior; Coordination; Oligopoly; Rate of profit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995-12
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01526503v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in [Research Report] Laboratoire d'analyse et de techniques économiques(LATEC). 1995, 32 p., bibliographie

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-01526503v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Industrial organization with profit rate maximing firms (1995)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01526503

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().