Optimal Supervisory Architecture and Financial Integration in a Banking Union

Jean-Edouard Colliard

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: Both in the United States and in the Euro Area, bank supervision is the joint responsibility of local and central supervisors. I study a model in which local supervisors do not internalize as many externalities as a central supervisor. Local supervisors are more lenient, but banks also have weaker incentives to hide information from them. These two forces can make a joint supervisory architecture optimal, with more weight put on centralized supervision when cross-border externalities are larger. Conversely, more centralized supervision endogenously encourages banks to integrate more cross-border. Due to this complementarity, the economy can be trapped in an equilibrium with both too little central supervision and too little financial integration, when a superior equilibrium would be achievable.

Keywords: banking union; bank supervision; financial integration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-09-11
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Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal Supervisory Architecture and Financial Integration in a Banking Union* (2020)
Working Paper: Optimal Supervisory Architecture and Financial Integration in a Banking Union (2018)
Working Paper: Optimal Supervisory Architecture and Financial Integration in a Banking Union (2017)
Working Paper: Optimal supervisory architecture and financial integration in a banking union (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01941516

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