Regulation of media bias on online newspapers

Jun Hu ()
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Jun Hu: UP2 - Université Panthéon-Assas

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This paper examines the impact of government regulation in the media market. In a duopolistic market structure, the intervention of a state-owned media firm without bias will reduce the price of the print version of a newspaper, but will increase its digital subscription fee. Moreover, the government regulation will not necessarily reduce the media slanting. The User-Generated Content of a digital version of a newspaper, along with the media bias from both supply-side and the demand-side, make the government regulation much less effective.

Keywords: Government Regulation; Spatial Model; Social Media; Media Bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-03-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pay
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03120466v3
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