Matching In Closed Forms

Ulysse Lawogni
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Ulysse Lawogni: THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université

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Abstract: In this paper, we consider an equally weighted bipartite matching market with transferability of the utility. We analyze the equilibrium of the market in the case of nearly full matching and in the case of nearly scarce matching. Considering a particular case of full matching with a quadratic specification and Gaussian distributions of the characteristics, we find entirely the analytical expression the optimal matching and of the individual surpluses gained by the partners from the sharing of the joint surplus at the equilibrium. We provide two ways to estimate the model.

Date: 2021-11-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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