Rank Dependent Weighted Average Utility Models for Decision Making under Ignorance or Objective Ambiguity

Nicolas Gravel () and Thierry Marchant

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Abstract: The paper provides an axiomatic characterization of a family of rank dependent weighted average utility criteria applicable to decisions under ignorance or objective ambiguity. A decision under ignorance is described by the finite set of its final consequences while a decision under objective ambiguity is described by a finite set of probability distributions over a set of final consequences. The criteria characterized are those that assign to every element in a set a weight that depends upon the rank of this element if it was available for sure (or non-ambiguously) and that compare sets on the basis of their weighted utility for some utility function. A specific subfamily of these criteria that requires the weights to be proportional to each other is also characterized.

Keywords: Ignorance; Ambiguity; Ranking Sets; Axioms; Ranks; Weights; Utility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-10-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-upt
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://amu.hal.science/hal-03817362v1
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Working Paper: Rank Dependent Weighted Average Utility Models for Decision Making under Ignorance or Objective Ambiguity (2022)
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