Application of double social sanction for generalized credit granting models in microfinance

Application de double sanction sociale pour les modèles généralisés d'octroi de crédit en microfinance

Philibert Andriamanantena (), Abdou Issouf, (), Mamy Raoul Ravelomanana () and Rakotozafy Rivo, ()
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Philibert Andriamanantena: Lycée Jean RALAIMONGO, Ankofafa Andrefana, 301 Fianarantsoa,
Abdou Issouf,: Université des Comores, BP 2585, Moroni, rue de la Corniche Comores
Mamy Raoul Ravelomanana: Université d’Antananarivo, Faculté de Droit, d’Economie, de Gestion et de Sociologie Ankatso, 101 Madagascar
Rakotozafy Rivo,: Université de Fianarantsoa

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Abstract: In this article, we apply the double social sanction for generalized credit granting models in microfinance. These generalized models are the basis of a Markov chain and allow the consideration of a certain number of states of nature whether in the case of an individual loan contract or a group loan contract. which are among others: the initial state $A^1$, the states $B_1$, $B_2$, $B_3$, $I$, $I_1$ and $I_2$ of being a beneficiary including financial inclusion and the excluded states $A^T$ \ldots $A^2$ representing the ($T- 1$) states of financial exclusion. In relation to these states, the application of social sanctions allows the institution to implicitly discriminate between borrowers and to find a compromised balance from the choice point of view and from the repayment point of view. For a social sanction considered too strong, the least risky borrowers will prefer the individual loan contract. Thus, they do not have to suffer any possible social sanction and do not have to possibly pay the transfer charge of the joint responsibility. On the other hand, with low social sanctions, borrowers will lean towards the group loan contract.

Keywords: Group loan; individual loan; double social sanction; microfinance; social capital; Prêt de groupe; prêt individuel; double sanction sociale; microfinance; capital social; Prêt de groupe; prêt individuel; double sanction sociale; microfinance; capital social Group loan; individual loan; double social sanction; social capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-09-21
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