Multiwinner elections with diversity constraints on individual preferences

Sylvain Béal, Marc Deschamps, Mostapha Diss and Rodrigue Tido Takeng
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Rodrigue Tido Takeng: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We address the problem of selecting a committee of a specified size from a given set of candidates, where individuals are requested to provide their preferences in the form of linear rankings of the candidates. In this framework, the selection of a committee depends on the multiwinner voting rule, also known as the committee selection rule. In this paper, we assume that the candidates possess an official attribute, namely the gender identity. Additionally, the linear ordering of voters should meet some diversity requirements (such as alternating males and females positions, ranking a certain number/percentage of males and females in the top half of the linear ranking, etc.) in order to be considered as admissible for the voting process. The objective of this paper is to assess the cost incurred by implementing diversity restrictions on the preferences of voters. We present a measure for assessing the cost of diversity and calculate the maximum cost, or upper bound, for a commonly used family of multiwinner voting methods known as (weakly) separable committee scoring rules.

Keywords: Voting; multiwinner elections; (weakly) separable committee scoring rules; diversity constraints; price of diversity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-02-06
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Working Paper: Multiwinner elections with diversity constraints on individual preferences (2024)
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