Fiscalité environnementale (LIEPP Working Paper, n°165)

Fiscalité environnementale

Céline Grislain-Letrémy () and Amélie Mauroux
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Céline Grislain-Letrémy: Banque de France - Banque de France - Banque de France, ENSAE - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse Economique - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse Economique, CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - ENSAI - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information [Bruz] - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - ENSAE Paris - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Amélie Mauroux: CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - ENSAI - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information [Bruz] - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - ENSAE Paris - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: In this Working Paper, we examine the public policies implemented in France over the last twenty years based on tax incentives in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the industrial, transport and residential sectors. This analysis is based on existing statistical evaluations of their impact, according to several criteria, which are effectiveness in achieving the objectives set, efficiency (defined as effectiveness in relation to the cost to public finances of the tonne of CO2 avoided), redistributive effects, and existence of alternative instruments. Despite the specificities of each field, several common features emerge. Firstly, both tax credits and targeted bonus-malus subsidies are effective in triggering investment and renewal choices. However, their impact on energy consumption and ultimately greenhouse gas emissions is difficult to measure ex post and probably limited, because of the CO2 emitted during the production of new equipments. Secondly, these tools have proved to be very costly and, above all, much more than expected. Their success has exceeded the legislator's expectations, raising the question of upstream calibration. Finally, the efficiency and redistributive effects of these policies are questioned.

Keywords: environmental policy; tax incentives; tax credit; bonus-malus; carbon tax; energy renovation; emissions trading; Public policy evaluation; Évaluation de politique publique; politique environnementale; incitations fiscales; crédit d'impôt; taxe carbone; rénovation énergétique; marché de permis d'émissions; FOS: Social sciences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-06-22
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04615404

DOI: 10.25647/liepp.wp.165

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