Efficiency and Application Fees in School Choice

Cyril Rouault

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This paper explores the impact of application fees on student strategies within the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism. We show that application fees reduce the set of Nash equilibria under DA. While they can lead to Pareto-efficient assignments, application fees may also prevent Nash equilibria that result in assignments Pareto-dominating the student-optimal stable assignment. This occurs when application fees are positive for all students at a given school.

Keywords: Matching; Application Fees; Efficiency; Stability; Nash Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-07-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04630065v2
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