Cooperative Games with Coalition-wise Permission Structures and their Application to Liability Situations

Takaaki Abe, David Lowing (), Satoshi Nakada and Kevin Techer
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Takaaki Abe: Kyushu University
David Lowing: CentraleSupélec, LGI - Laboratoire Génie Industriel - CentraleSupélec - Université Paris-Saclay
Satoshi Nakada: Tokyo University of Science [Tokyo]
Kevin Techer: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne

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Date: 2024-07-16
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04650614

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4889624

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